*Leading proxy advisors ISS and Glass Lewis recommend shareholders vote AGAINST the re-election of CEO Takeshi Natsuno and FOR Oasis’s shareholder proposal to dismiss him from the Board
*ISS says: “Given the background of questionable strategy and poor execution, replacing Natsuno appears as the best path forward”
*Glass Lewis cites “material governance and performance concerns,” and notes that Oasis raises reasonable concerns regarding Mr. Natsuno’s leadership, commitment, and the Company’s performance under his leadership
*Oasis urges KADOKAWA shareholders to send a clear message for accountability and meaningful leadership change at the June 2026 AGM
More information is available at www.abetterkadokawa.com
HONG KONG–(BUSINESS WIRE)–Oasis Management Company Ltd. (“Oasis”), the investment manager to private funds that own approximately 13.76% of the shares in KADOKAWA CORPORATION (“KADOKAWA” or the “Company”), today welcomed the recommendations of the two leading independent proxy advisory firms, Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) and Glass, Lewis & Co. (“Glass Lewis”) provided for the Company’s AGM scheduled for June 24, 2026.
In their respective reports, both ISS and Glass Lewis recommend that shareholders:
- Vote AGAINST the Company’s proposal to reappoint CEO Takeshi Natsuno as a director (Agenda 1, Candidate No.1); and
- Vote FOR Oasis’s shareholder proposal to dismiss CEO Takeshi Natsuno as a director (Agenda 2).
Importantly, both advisors also recommended that shareholders vote AGAINST the re-election of Board Chairman and Chairman of the Company’s nomination committee, Hiroo Unoura (Agenda 1, Candidate No.6), reflecting broader governance concerns at KADOKAWA.
ISS concluded that accountability for CEO Natsuno is warranted, stating:
“Given the background of questionable strategy and poor execution, replacing Natsuno appears as the best path forward.”
Glass Lewis likewise recognized the seriousness of the concerns raised by Oasis, concluding that:
“Oasis’s concerns regarding management accountability, execution credibility, Mr. Natsuno’s level of commitment, and the Company’s performance under his leadership may appear reasonable at this time.”
Oasis believes these independent recommendations strongly validate the need for change at KADOKAWA. The Company’s deteriorating performance, repeated execution failures, weak governance and lack of management accountability can no longer be treated as isolated issues. Shareholders now have a clear opportunity at the June 2026 AGM to send a message that meaningful leadership accountability and governance reform are required.
Seth H. Fischer, Founder and Chief Investment Officer of Oasis, said:
“The recommendations of ISS and Glass Lewis confirm what KADOKAWA’s own results have made clear: change at the top is overdue. Two of the world’s leading independent proxy advisors have now reached the same conclusion as Oasis — that the Company’s performance, strategy and governance under CEO Natsuno fall short of what shareholders, creators, employees and partners deserve. CEO Natsuno himself stated in February 2023 that failure to deliver business growth should put his resignation into view. By his own standard, and with independent advisors now aligned, that moment has arrived.”
To hold management accountable for KADOKAWA’s deteriorating performance, failed execution, weak governance, and, most importantly, its failure to maximize the value of its exceptional IP portfolio, Oasis reiterates its call for shareholders to vote AGAINST the Company’s proposal to reappoint CEO Natsuno (Agenda 1, Candidate No.1) and vote FOR Oasis’s shareholder proposal to dismiss CEO Natsuno as a director (Agenda 2).
Further details regarding ISS’s and Glass Lewis’s analysis, including the key findings underlying their recommendations, are available on Oasis’s campaign website at www.abetterkadokawa.com. Oasis encourages all shareholders to review these materials ahead of the 2026 AGM and welcomes all stakeholders to contact Oasis at [email protected] to help create “A Better KADOKAWA.”
Oasis is not in any way soliciting or requesting shareholders to jointly exercise their voting rights together with Oasis. Shareholders that have an agreement to jointly exercise their voting rights are regarded as “Joint Holders” under the Japanese large shareholding disclosure rules, and they must file a notification of their aggregate share ownership with the relevant Japanese authority for public disclosure. Oasis disclaims any intention to be treated as a Joint Holder and/or a Specially Related Person with any other shareholder under the Japanese Financial Instruments and Exchange Act (“FIEA”) by virtue of the expression of views and opinions and/or any engagement with shareholders and other third parties in or through this document, any public statements or any other information or materials created and/or published by Oasis (whether written or oral, and regardless of medium). Oasis has no intention to receive any power to represent other shareholders in relation to the exercise of their voting rights. This document exclusively represents the opinions, interpretations, and estimates of Oasis. Oasis is expressing such opinions solely in its capacity as an investment advisor to the Oasis funds. Oasis and/or the investment funds it advises hold, and may in the future hold, investments in the company referenced in this document. Accordingly, the views and opinions expressed in this document should not be regarded as impartial. Nothing in this document should be taken as any indication of Oasis’s current or future trading, voting or other intentions which may change at any time. Nothing stated herein is intended to be or should be construed as a proposal for the purposes of paragraph 1 of Article 14-8-2 of the Order for Enforcement of the FIEA (Cabinet Order No 321 of 1965), as amended by Cabinet Order No 247 of 4 July 2025 or otherwise, unless otherwise expressly indicated. The Document exclusively represents the opinions, interpretations, and estimates of Oasis.
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